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Abstract 
Over five experiments we test the fictive pass asymmetry hypothesis. Following 
observations of ethics and public reactions to media, we propose that fictional contexts, such as 
reality, imagination, and virtual environments, will mitigate people’s moral condemnation of 
harm violations, more so than purity violations. That is, imagining a purely harmful act is given a 
“fictive pass,” in moral judgment, whereas imagining an abnormal act involving the body is 
evaluated more negatively because it is seen as more diagnostic of bad character. For Experiment 
1, an undergraduate sample (N = 250) evaluated nine vignettes depicting an agent committing 
either violations of harm or purity in real life, watching them in films, or imagining them. For 
Experiments 2 and 3, online participants (N = 375 and N = 321, respectively) evaluated a single 
vignette depicting an agent committing a violation of harm or purity that either occurred in real 
life, was imagined, watched in a film, or performed in a video game. Experiment 4 (N = 348) 
used an analysis of moderated mediation to demonstrate that the perceived wrongness of 
fictional purity violations is explained both by the extent to which they are seen as a cue to, and a 
cause of, a poor moral character. Lastly, Experiment 5 (N = 484) validated our manipulations and 
included the presumption of desire as an additional mediator of the fictive pass asymmetry 
effects. We discuss implications for moral theories of act and character, anger and disgust, and 
for media use and regulation.  
Keywords: moral emotions, moral judgments, moral domains, media, fiction 
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Imagining wrong: Fictitious contexts mitigate condemnation of harm more than impurity 
In the late 1960’s, two pieces of fiction were released that both caused a fair amount of 
controversy but were received very differently. Philip Roth’s Portnoy’s Complaint contained 
bizarre and graphic descriptions of a teenage boy masturbating with objects ranging from a 
candy bar wrapper, to his sister’s bra, and most infamously, a raw piece of liver that was later 
cooked and eaten by his family. Portnoy’s Complaint was met with fierce resistance. It was 
called obscene and filthy, and it was even banned in Australia (Lay, 2013). In contrast, in the 
same year, Sam Peckinpah’s film The Wild Bunch, was criticized for being, “The most violent 
movie ever made”, but still evoked “cheering, applauding, and laughing” (Ebert, 1969) from the 
audience. Clearly, these two types of fictions were not evaluated equally. 
More recently, this tendency to judge fictional sex more harshly than fictional violence 
has been remarked upon in the context of computer games (Brown v. Entertainment Merchants 
Association, 2011; Young & Whitty, 2011), and demonstrated in the case of film ratings (Leone, 
2004; Olson, 2014; Thompson & Yokota, 2004). The issue has also been breached in ethical 
philosophy; Luck (2009), for example, acknowledges the existence of this asymmetry in lay 
morality while making a prescriptive argument against it. 
  In the present paper, we aim to provide systematic evidence for this phenomenon, which 
we label the fictive pass asymmetry, and to explain its corollary judgments and emotions. We 
compare moral judgments of real life acts to moral judgments of imagining those acts, or 
consuming them in fiction. Normally, judgments of things that are “make-believe” should be less 
severe – they should get a “pass” in moral judgment. However, we think that this pass is more 
strongly given to fictions in which immoral acts harm other people directly, compared to fictions 
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in which immoral acts are not immediately harmful to others but violate norms of purity (that is, 
involving a counter-normative use of the body, such as violating a sexual taboo). We investigate 
this hypothesis across various fictive contexts, including media products and one’s own 
imagination. 
Recent research has argued that violations of harm and purity, among others, form 
distinct moral domains (Chakroff, Dungan, & Young, 2013; Graham, Nosek, Haidt, Iyer, 
Koleva, & Ditto, 2011; Rozin, et al., 1999; Russell, Piazza, & Giner-Sorolla, 2013). Violations 
of the harm domain are physical acts of violence or deprivation with specific negative outcomes 
for others. Violations of purity are most centrally those acts that violate bodily moral norms 
(Giner-Sorolla, Bosson, Caswell, & Hettinger, 2013; Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2013). This may 
include sexual acts that are seen as wrong in and of themselves regardless of consent (e.g. 
incest), food consumption that goes against religious tenets, or body modifications that are seen 
as a defilement of the self. An alternate view characterizes both types of violation as involving 
harm, but to different targets; that is, acts classified in the “harm” domain involve injury to 
specific individuals (as in the original statement of dyadic morality theory; Gray & Wegner, 
2010) whereas acts classified in the “purity” domain are seen as harming non-specific entities 
such as nature or society (as in revised views of that theory; Gray, Schein, & Ward, 2014; see 
also Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2011). A number of conceivable acts such as sexual violence or 
bloody injury may be seen as violating both harm and purity norms; however, to test the fictive 
pass asymmetry we focus on acts that offer explicit demarcation between these domains. 
In these experiments, as in much of the moral psychology literature, impure acts are seen 
as not harming specific people, yet abnormal. Additionally, we more specifically define such acts 
as those that involve a per se immoral use of the body (Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2013). Most 
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studies in this paper were conducted in this framework, and so follow convention in the moral 
psychology literature by referring to these types of acts as “purity code violations”.  In 
Experiment 5, however, we added additional measures that allowed us to consider an alternate 
perspective that has been proposed by Gray et al., (2014) which argues that strictly impure acts 
are seen as causing harm, just to non-social entities. In sum, Experiments 1 through 4 define 
purity code violations as abnormal acts that involve an immoral use of one’s body without 
harming specific others (Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2013), while Experiment 5 also considers the 
extent to which purity code violations can be alternately categorized as those that involve some 
kind of impersonal harm or harm to self.  
We were primarily interested in the extent to which negative moral judgments and 
emotions aroused by judging harm and purity violations would cross the line from real to fantasy 
contexts. Recent research gives a theoretical context to the fictive pass asymmetry hypothesis by 
identifying unique ways in which different kinds of immoral acts are evaluated. Firstly, 
researchers have identified an act-character divide in moral judgments (Pizarro, Tannenbaum, & 
Uhlmann, 2012; Tannenbaum, Uhlmann, & Diermeier, 2011; Uhlmann, Zhu, & Diermeier, 
2014). Acts that directly harm people are seen as bad due to their consequences, while other acts 
(e. g. violence towards a cat) are seen as more solely indicative of bad character (Tannenbaum et 
al., 2011). Following this line of thought, Chakroff and Young (2015) demonstrated an 
attributional asymmetry between the moral domains of harm and purity: impure acts that do not 
involve harming other people, relative to harmful acts that do not involve impurity, are more 
condemned because of character-based attributions. By contrast, people endorsed more act-based 
explanations for acts that harmed individuals. Even though acts experienced through fiction do 
not harm specific persons, they signal the status of one’s moral character, or can even be seen to 
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corrupt and undermine character. Acts that harm other people may be condemned more in real 
life than immoral acts that do not, because of their consequences for others, but in fiction both 
acts indicate an engagement with the idea of breaking social norms, that would lead to more 
equivalent appraisals of bad character.  
The moral emotions of anger and disgust are most commonly associated with violations 
of harm and purity, respectively, although they often co-occur (Russell, Piazza, & Giner-Sorolla, 
2013). As in previous research, we expect that real-life purity violations, compared to harm 
violations, will evoke more disgust relative to anger and vice-versa. We will also explore the 
possibility that when anger and disgust are distinguishable from one another, fictive pass 
asymmetry effects will present themselves differently between these emotions. Anger, more so 
then disgust, is a flexible emotion (Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011a; 2011b) associated with 
harmful behavior. For instance, Piazza, Russell, & Sousa, Study 1 (2013) found that anger, 
independent of disgust, negatively predicts the envisaging of mitigating circumstances of both 
harm and purity code violations. Meanwhile disgust, when anger was controlled for, had no 
relation to participant’s envisaging of mitigating circumstances. Consistent with this, Russell and 
Giner-Sorolla (2011b) instructed participants to justify both harmful and impure acts. The 
amount of anger that the participants experienced changed as a result of this exercise. Their 
levels of disgust, on the other hand, were relatively more stable. For the present research, we 
believe that when anger is directed at fictional versus real behavior, if already at high levels, it 
should drop more than disgust does. In other words, when one imagines harm to specific others 
in a fictional context, the amount of anger should diminish, leaving the co-occurrent emotion of 
disgust as the more prevalent emotional reaction. This reasoning suggests that the asymmetry 
should be more evident for measures of anger than for measures of disgust. 
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To sum up, our fictive pass asymmetry hypothesis predicts that fictitious harm to others 
will be given a pass and subjected to less condemnation than its real-life counterpart. On the 
other hand, fictitious moral violations that do not harm specific others (“purity”) should be 
denied a pass. In the strongest expression of this, fictional acts that violate purity norms should 
be subjected to as much condemnation as their real-life counterparts. However, it could also be 
that fictional purity violations are condemned less than real-life ones in absolute terms, but that 
this drop is smaller than the drop between reality and fiction for harm violations. 
Across five experiments we examine the effect of a number of different fictional contexts 
on moral judgments of described acts that violate the moral norms of harm and purity. In each 
experiment, we compare the context of real life to a number of fictional contexts, such as 
imagination, film and video games. Since we did not have any specific hypothesis regarding the 
relative strength of fictional contexts, within each experiment they were collapsed into a single 
index to facilitate clear reporting. After the last experiment, we also report the outcome of a 
meta-analysis across a set of comparable experiments that included the same set of fictional 
contexts, looking at differences in fictive pass effects between the contexts. 
To give an overview, Experiment 1 is an initial test of the fictive pass asymmetry 
hypothesis. Experiment 2 replicates this finding with different media contexts and moral 
violation examples. Experiments 3, 4 and 5 extend the former experiments by including all of the 
previously examined fictitious contexts. They sequentially add measures that allowed the design 
to address what kind of character judgments mediate the effect, how the effect extends into a 
desire to punish the offender, and to what extent fictional acts indicate one’s true desires. 
Methodological Notes 
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With the exception of Experiment 1 (a university student sample), all participants were 
recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk (www.mturk.com). Participants recruited via 
Mechanical Turk were all living in the USA, and were given financial compensation for their 
participation. Criteria for excluding participants from the analysis were: unfinished 
questionnaires, rote responses (e.g. endorsing the same scale point across all items), or failing 
attention-checking questions. When possible, new participants were recruited in their stead. 
Sample sizes were determined a priori and not altered based on results. We report all measures 
and manipulations in these experiments. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants. Two hundred fifty undergraduate psychology students (196 female; Mage = 
20.3; SDage = 4.1) from a university in southern England participated for course credit. Twenty-
six participants (10%) were excluded based on the stated criteria. This sample size, based on 
availability, was conservatively high for the within-subjects design (i.e., it had over 95%  power 
to detect a small f of 0.15 given r = 0.30 among measures), but we thought this appropriate for 
an initial test of the hypothesis. 
Design.  Each participant evaluated nine vignettes that depicted fictional agents 
committing different types of abnormal behavior (harm, purity, and pathogen, as described 
below). Within these nine vignettes, three were described as occurring in real life, three as 
imagined by the main agent, and three as watched in a film by the main agent. Counterbalancing, 
using 27 different sets of pairings between participants, ensured that each participant responded 
to nine combinations of the two factors’ three levels. The key design for analysis was within-
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participants, 3 (code: harm vs purity vs pathogen) x 2 (context: reality vs fiction). As previously 
explained, the two fictional contexts were collapsed to form a single level. 
Pretest. The nine vignettes for Experiment 1 were derived from a pretest in which 31 
undergraduate participants rated their judgments of levels of anger, disgust, and moral wrongness 
for twenty vignettes that depicted violations of harm (e.g. falsifying information on a CV to get 
unjustly hired) and purity (e.g. consensual sibling incest), presented as occurring in real life. In 
each vignette, one person – the agent – was named and identified as committing the violation. 
For each code violation, we selected three vignettes that were similar in moral wrongness. Our 
selections were also confirmed by each selected vignette showing the expected pattern of 
emotional responses (i.e. anger significantly > disgust for harm and disgust significantly > anger 
for purity). This selection method allowed us to be confident that our effects would be due to the 
code violation portrayed by each set of vignettes rather than differences in overall disapproval. 
Through pretesting, we also identified vignettes of pathogen violations – that is, 
physically disgusting, but relatively less morally objectionable violations that threaten personal 
health (e.g. eating spoiled food), which proved to be high in disgust but relatively low in both 
anger and moral violation rating. These were included in this first experiment to test whether 
pathogen would show a similar lack of fictive pass as predicted for purity violations. All 
vignettes, contextualized in reality, are reported in the supplementary material, document A.  
Materials. The wording of the pretested vignettes were manipulated to depict the acts as 
occurring in reality or as in a fictional context. For example, in the context of reality a harm 
violation appeared as “Janice decided to put some false information on her CV in order to make 
it more impressive. By doing this she managed to get hired over candidates who were actually 
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more qualified”. In the context of imagination, the vignette appeared as, “Janice imagined 
putting some false information on her CV in order to make it more impressive. She imagines that 
by doing this she manages to get hired over candidates who were actually more qualified”. 
 A one-item measure assessed the moral wrongness of the main agent’s act (How morally 
wrong was [agent’s name]’s behavior?) from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Very much). Two items more 
directly tapped the moral character of the main agent: one item asked “Do you think [agent’s 
name] is mainly a good or bad person?” (1 = mainly good; 7 = mainly bad) and the other asked 
“Do you think [agent’s name] has good moral standards?” (1 = Completely; 7 = Not at all; r = 
.73). To measure anger and disgust towards the main agent, we asked participants to endorse on 
two separate scales how much the vignette made them feel like each of two photos of facial 
expressions, representing anger or disgust at 100% intensity (Beaupré ,  Cheung , & Hess, 2000), 
as well as scaled measures of the target emotions which asked participants to report three anger-
related feelings (anger, outraged, furious) and three disgust-related (disgust, revolted, sickened) 
from 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Entirely) (Anger α = .91; Disgust α = .95). See Table 1 for descriptive 
statistics. The measures of Experiment 1, and all subsequent experiments, can be found in 
supplementary material, document B.  
Results 
In the data structure, each participant x vignette combination was a separate case, 
containing the same measures. Each of the four dependent measures – wrongness, character, 
anger, disgust - was analyzed using two separate 2 x 2 mixed linear models, each of which 
crossed one of two moral code contrasts (harm vs purity; or harm vs pathogen) with a two-level 
context contrast (reality vs fiction). Participant was a random factor and moral code and context 
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were fixed factors. This method accounted for the non-independence of each participant’s 
responses to the within-participant vignettes. 
Because generally similar patterns of results were identified across most of the moral 
judgment variables; we discuss the common pattern in terms of general “condemnation” while 
remarking on any individual variables that deviated from this pattern. See supplementary 
material, document C for the means and standard deviations of each experimental condition. 
Harm vs Purity Contrasts. Consistent with our predictions, the contrast of fiction with 
reality yielded a series of significant interactions that indicated an evaluative asymmetry: a 
greater “fictive pass” that mitigated judgments of harm versus purity violations. Specifically, 
fictional harm, compared to real harm, showed reduced moral condemnation and anger, but this 
reduction was nonexistent or not as large when comparing fictional and real purity violations. 
These effects did not, however, apply to disgust, for which a non-significant Code x Context 
interaction (p = .97) indicated that levels of disgust between real and fictional acts dropped by 
equal amounts across both code violations (see Figure 1). 
Harm vs Pathogen Contrasts. We then tested whether pathogen violations showed 
asymmetry effects when compared to harm violations. As predicted, significant interactions 
across the reality-fiction contrasts indicated that pathogen acts, though less morally relevant than 
harm violations, were largely denied a pass. In other words, one who commits an act that evokes 
pathogen transmission in a fictional context is as condemnable as one who commits the acts in 
real-life. As with the harm-purity contrast, this asymmetry was not observed in disgust. It 
dropped equal amounts between real and fictional acts for both code violations (see Figure 2). 
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 For moral judgments and anger, these results strongly suggest that acts that are disgusting 
because they threaten personal health, even when less morally relevant than harmful acts, are 
about as condemnable in fiction as in real-life. It should be noted that while harm violations were 
seen as more immoral than pathogen violation, the mean of the pathogen acts was closer to the 
scale midpoint of 4 (M = 2.90) than to the lowest scale point of 1. Effectively, some moral 
condemnation of these acts was present, so these effects cannot be easily explained by a floor 
effect.  
Summary 
Experiment 1 lent initial empirical support to the fictive pass asymmetry hypothesis. As 
expected, fictitious harm versus purity violations were granted more of a fictive pass (i.e. were 
less condemned), as indicated by a steeper slope from reality to fiction. This was true for general 
moral judgments, perceived moral character, and anger towards one who perpetrates harmful 
behavior. By contrast, purity violations were denied a fictive pass to some extent, presenting a 
significantly less severe evaluative discrepancy between reality and fiction.  
The one unexpected finding was in the exact nature of the lack of asymmetry for disgust. 
We confirmed that disgust would show a similar degree of fictive pass in both harm and purity 
violations. However, we also thought that the fictive pass effect for disgust would be low; but 
disgust actually showed an equal and significant drop for both types of violations, such that it 
was granted more of a fictive pass for purity violations than anger or overall judgment was. At 
this point, however, it is premature to conclude anything without the effect generalizing and 
replicating in further experiments. 
Experiment 2 
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As an initial test of the fictive pass, Experiment 1, measured general morality and moral 
character, but there was not a clear distinction between act-based and character-based judgments 
(Uhlmann & Zhu, 2013). Experiment 2, therefore, used separate scales to distinguish between 
these types of judgments. We also dropped the pathogen condition in order to focus more 
centrally on highly morally relevant violations. 
Furthermore, the within-participants design of Experiment 1 required participants to 
make joint evaluations of the different contexts in the same session. Because allowing explicit 
comparisons of the contexts may have distorted evaluations (Greenwald, 1976), Experiment 2 
used an entirely between-subjects design in which each participant evaluated a single vignette. 
 In this second experiment, we used different vignettes to present harmful and impure 
acts. We also sought greater comparability between the fictional contexts, replacing the 
imagination condition with a video game condition, so that both were media products. 
Method 
Participants. Three hundred fifty-seven participants were recruited online (229 male; 
Mage = 31.5, SDage = 9.7). Forty-four (12%) were excluded from analysis for reasons previously 
discussed.  
Design. Experiment 2 employed a 2 (moral code: harm vs purity) x 2 (context of 
violation: reality vs fiction, collapsed from 3 conditions) between-subjects design. The 
questionnaire presented a single story setting that randomly presented one of the six possible 
combinations of conditions. Harmful acts violated another’s rights, but were free of physical 
disgust (e.g. a young man deceiving an old woman for inheritance). Impure acts, by contrast, 
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involved violations of bodily norms that were entirely consensual and free of harm (e.g. a young 
man having a consensual sexual relationship with an elderly woman). 
Materials. The wording of the vignettes was manipulated so that the acts could be 
presented as occurring in a variety of contexts. For example, one of the purity vignettes in the 
context of real-life read, “Robert is a university student who owns a piercing gun. He goes to 
parties and enjoys giving genital piercings to anyone who wants one.” In the context of being 
watched in a film the vignette read, “Robert watches a film about a university student who owns 
a piercing gun. The student goes to parties and enjoys giving genital piercings to anyone who 
wants one. Robert enjoys watching this film.” 
The emotion measures were unchanged from Experiment 1. Despite this, the mean scores 
of the anger items (α = .97) and the disgust items (α = .96) had an unusually strong correlation, r 
= .87, p < .001. Because of this, we created a composite score of moral outrage. The act and 
character-based judgments were differentiated with one scale measuring the agent’s moral 
character (Is [Agent] “rotten inside”?; Is [Agent] immoral?; Is [Agent’s soul impure?; Would 
you say that [Agent] has good character?; Is [Agent] mainly a good or mainly a bad person?; α 
= .91) and another measuring the morality of the act he committed (Is this a “rotten” thing to do; 
Is this action morally blameworthy? Is this action deserving of punishment? Is this action 
immoral? α = .96). As with the emotion measures, however, the act and character scales were 
highly correlated (r = .85, p < .001) so a composite item of moral wrongness was created. The 
correlation of the moral wrongness and moral outrage composites was, however, also very high 
at r = .83 [.79, .86], p < .001. As such, we created yet another composite that assessed negativity 
towards the described act. 
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The single resultant dependent measure – negativity -- was analyzed using an ANOVA 
that crossed the type of violation with the reality/fiction contrast, 2 (moral code: harm vs purity) 
x 2 (context of violation: reality vs fiction). 
Results 
 For the measure of negativity, the main effects of code and context indicated that real acts 
and harmful acts were judged as relatively more negative that impure act and fictional acts. A 
significant Code x Context interaction also supported the fictive pass asymmetry hypothesis. 
Fictional harm was judged as less negative than real harm but fictional purity was judged about 
as negatively as its real-life counterpart (see Figure 3). 
Experiment 3 
Although the results of Experiment 2 did not offer as clear a distinction as hoped between 
moral judgments of act and character or between emotional responses, the findings once more 
lent support to the fictive pass asymmetry hypothesis, while generalizing to a different set of 
violations, contexts, and using a between-participants design with no explicit comparison 
between vignettes. It was found that evaluations of harm declined significantly from real to 
fictional contexts, but evaluations of purity violations stayed about the same across both 
contexts.  
One limitation of Experiment 2 was that we used a different set of violations to 
generalize from Experiment 1, but without pretesting for equivalent moral wrongness. As it 
turned out, that set of purity violations was rated as overall less wrong than the harm violations. 
Mean condemnation of real and fictional purity violations alike was about halfway between the 
scale minimum of 1 and midpoint of 4, raising the possibility that a floor effect could be held 
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responsible for the lesser difference between real and fictive contexts in purity. In fact, a similar 
if smaller interaction effect was found when the data were analyzed excluding all negativity 
mean responses less than 2, F(1, 183) = 9.27, p = .003, ηp2 = .05, making it less plausible that a 
floor effect was completely responsible for our effects. However, the reduction in effect shows 
that it would be desirable to use moral situations with means closer to the midpoint. Therefore, 
Experiment 3 joined together all the fictive contexts tested so far, and used a new set of pretested 
moral situations that would all be near or above the scale midpoint in real-life condemnation.  
Method 
Pretest and vignette selection. The researchers wrote 42 vignettes that depicted violations of 
harm or purity. Participants (N = 132) recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service were 
randomly presented with six vignettes. Each was followed by a forced choice facial expression 
agreement measure for anger and disgust using expressions from Beaupré et al., (2000). After 
this, self-report measures of anger, disgust, and moral wrongness were presented in a random 
order. These measures all ranged from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). The average length of 
participation was 3.5 minutes and participants were compensated with $0.40. 
 Ultimately, we selected two harm vignettes and two purity vignettes that elicited the 
expected differential emotions (e.g. purity violations that were higher in disgust than anger) and 
that were similar in moral wrongness. There was no statistically significant difference in moral 
wrongness between the two harm vignettes, t(26) = 0.96, p = .35), the two purity vignettes, (t(26) 
= 0.74, p = .47), or among all four vignettes, F(3,61) = 0.44, p = .73.  
Participants. 321 participants (229 male; Mage = 31.5, SDage = 9.7) were recruited from 
Mechanical Turk. Owing to similar measures and manipulations, anyone who had participated in 
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Experiment 2 was not able to participate. Data of two participants (1%) were excluded for the 
previously stated reasons.  
Design and Materials. Experiment 3 was analyzed using a 2 (moral code: harm vs 
purity) x 2 (context of violation: reality vs fiction, collapsed from 4 conditions) between-subjects 
design. Participants were randomly assigned to read and evaluate a single vignette that presented 
a harm violation or a purity violation occurring in one of the four different contexts (real-life, 
imagined, watched in a film, performed in a video game). The harm vignettes described 
violations of autonomy (property destruction; verbal aggression) without any bodily moral norms 
violations. The purity vignettes described moral violations involving the body (sex with a dead 
chicken; bizarre bathroom behavior) that were free of harm to other persons. As before, the 
wording of these vignettes was manipulated to describe the acts as occurring in different 
contexts. For example, a harm code vignette in the context of real life read, “Sam shouted at his 
girlfriend because she did not have enough time to put on make-up before a date”. In the context 
of played in a video game, the same vignette read, “Sam plays a video game that takes place in a 
large and realistic environment. There are many different things, both good and bad, that Sam 
can control his character to do in this virtual environment. In this video game, Sam controls a 
character that's the same age as he is. He controls his character to shout at his character's 
girlfriend because she did not have enough time to put on make-up before a date. Sam enjoys 
playing this video game”. The dependent variables were unchanged from Experiment 2.  
Our fictive pass asymmetry hypothesis remained the same. We predicted that harm would 
display a steeper drop in condemnation from real life to fiction but that purity violations would 
remain more stable across these contexts. 
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Results 
The four anger items (α = .94) and the four disgust items (α = .94) were compiled into 
anger and disgust composite scores. The composites had a significant positive correlation with 
each other, but unlike in Experiment 2, the correlation was low enough (r = .42) that we could 
analyze each emotion separately.  
As before, the act-based (α = .91) and character-based (α = .94) moral judgment items 
both had strong Cronbach’s alphas and were turned into composite items. The correlation 
between these two scales was lower than in Experiment 2, but with a correlation of r = .77 [.72, 
.81], these two items still shared 59% of their variance. Regardless, these items were analyzed 
individually so that we could begin to identify act- and character-based explanations for the 
fictive pass asymmetry hypothesis (see Table 3).   
Main effects indicated that there was, in the main, little difference in character-based 
judgments between harm and purity violations. However, despite our pretesting real acts of harm 
(M = 5.01) were significantly more immoral than real acts of purity (M = 4.01), F(1, 73) = 8.06, 
p = .006. In line with pretesting, however, harm violations were associated most strongly with 
anger, and purity violations were associated most strongly with disgust. Furthermore, the 
baseline difference between real harm and purity acts did not plausibly mean that a floor effect 
on fictional purity acts could be held responsible for the fictive pass interaction. The mean for 
fictional purity, 3.49, was still much closer to the midpoint of 4 than to the scale minimum of 1. 
Code x Context interactions for the reality-fiction contrasts supported a fictive pass 
asymmetry in act-based judgments. Fictional harm was more acceptable than real-harm but 
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fictional purity was about as immoral as its real-life counterpart, even though real harm was 
condemned more than real purity violations were.   
Unlike the results for our previous experiments, character inferences showed weaker 
fictive pass asymmetry effects, with no significant interaction. This was partly due to real 
harmful acts being seen as less indicative of bad character, relative to their moral condemnation.   
Moral emotions, showed the expected main effects and, as in Experiment 1, partial 
evidence of a fictive pass asymmetry. Anger did not show fictive pass for it dropped equally 
between real and fictional contexts for both harm and purity code violations. As in Experiment 1, 
however, disgust’s reality to fiction drop was also about the same between moral code violations. 
In particular, the lack of a significant “pass” effect for disgust toward harm violations was more 
consistent with our initial predictions (see Figure 4). 
Experiment 41 
Experiments 1 through 3 have shown evidence that fictional harm is, by and large, more 
acceptable than fictional purity and that when anger and disgust are distinct from one another (as 
in Experiments 1 and 3), anger shows a fictive pass asymmetry whereas disgust does not. 
Furthermore, judgments of character often were highly correlated with judgments of the acts. 
Although this is consistent with the explanation that fictive purity violations are disapproved of 
because they indicate bad character, it would be more theoretically useful to be able to contrast 
                                                             
1 Another experiment was conducted between Experiment 3 and Experiment 4. Because of its similarity to the 
present Experiment 4 we decided to place it in supplementary materials G as Experiment 4b. 
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judgments of character against other facets of moral judgment that might not be expected to 
reflect the fictive pass asymmetry as strongly. Experiment 4 added a number of these facets.  
Given that act and character in the foregoing experiment were very closely related, a 
more distinct aspect of moral judgment might be the desire to punish. In scenarios describing 
potentially harmful behavior, Cushman (2008) found that manipulating desire to harm produced 
the greatest effect on judgments of bad character; while manipulating the actual harmfulness of 
the consequences produced a more unique effect on recommendations to punish the perpetrator. 
Both desire and harmfulness were related to judgments of overall moral wrongness. In the 
context of our research, a fictional code violation might be seen as morally wrong and as 
revealing bad character, but less worthy of punishment than a real wrong due to its lack of 
consequence. We thus tested whether punishment, distinct from moral judgment, would respond 
more strongly to consequence than to signs of bad character. 
A second innovation in this experiment explores the possibility that consuming immoral 
fiction is seen as having downstream consequences. Although we have speculated that engaging 
in impure fiction could be interpreted as a cue to an already bad character, another possibility is 
that consuming impure fiction is seen to actually cause bad character and bad behaviors. The 
Hays Code of 1930, which regulated the moral content of United States cinema, argued that 
films may “affect the moral standards of those who, through the screen, take in these ideas and 
ideals” or “inspire others with a desire for imitation” (Bynum, 2006), demonstrating concerns 
that media consumers might become corrupted by what they see, as well as emulating those 
behaviors. Of course, these two reasons are not mutually exclusive and might influence each 
other. We therefore included questions in Experiment 4 explicitly asking whether the acts 
described in the various conditions could worsen the consumer’s character, and the extent to 
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which the consumers may replicate this behavior. To avoid making these items seem tautological 
or non-sensual in the context of reality, the wording was slightly modified to fit each level of the 
context variable (e.g. from “Do [thoughts/films/video games] like this corrupt one’s character?” 
to “Do these actions corrupt one’s character?”).  
Method 
Participants. Three hundred and fifty-two participants (195 male; Mage = 33.98; SDage = 
10.51) were recruited from Mechanical Turk. Four participants (1.1%) were excluded according 
to the previous stated criteria. Participants from the former experiments were not able to 
participate. 
Design. The 2 (code violation: harm vs purity) x 2 (context of violation: reality vs fiction) 
between-subjects design was identical to that of Experiments 3 as were the vignettes that 
described the various immoral acts. The items that measured anger, disgust, and moral character 
were also unchanged. In an attempt to address the potential floor effects of the act-based 
judgments of the purity condition we clarified our measures of act condemnation. In previous 
experiments, it may not have been clear to participants if they were supposed be evaluation the 
fictional acts themselves, or their real-life counterparts. To make it more clear to participants that 
they should be specifically evaluating the fictitious act, we made slight modifications to the act-
based judgment items between the different contexts. For instance, an item from the previous 
experiments asked, “Is it morally blameworthy to do this?” across all contexts. Experiment 4, 
and all subsequent experiments, aimed to clarify these items with slight modifications between 
the different contexts. For example, “Is it morally blameworthy to [do this/imagine this/do this in 
a video game/watch this in a film]?” In fictional contexts, this should make it clear to 
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participants that they ought to specifically evaluate the fictional act, allowing for more valid act-
based measures.  
Materials. The new measures of consequence assessed the extent to which acts, either 
real or fictional, caused one to become corrupt (a cause of bad character) as well as the 
likelihood that one would commit the acts in real-life. For the reality condition, the wording of 
these items had to be slightly modified so that they would make sense and be less tautological. 
For example, participants rated items such as “Will [doing these sorts of things/imagining these 
sorts of things/watching these sorts of films/playing these sorts of video games] make Sam a 
morally bad person?” and “Will Sam do this in real-life? [because he did it in a video 
game/watched it in a film/imagined doing it]?” (9 items; α =. 93). Separating these items into 
two subscales, one for consequences to character and one for behavioral consequences,  revealed 
a correlation of r = .89. This gives further support for the assertion that character is useful as a 
cue to future behavior (Tannenbaum et al., 2011,Study 2; Pizarro, et al., 2012), and supports our 
decision to analyze the two types of item as a single scale. Again, the wording of these items was 
slightly modified across the different levels of the context variable conditions so that the text fit 
the context that was being evaluated. 
Lastly, participants’ desire to punish the offending agent was assessed with a single item 
that asked the extent to which the character in the vignette should be punished for his actions. 
This item was presented across all the contexts, real and fictional. Since the desire to punish is 
associated with the harmfulness of one’s actions (Cushman, 2008), we expected this measure to 
make further distinctions between judgments of character and the consequences of engaging with 
fictional code violations.  
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All scales had strong reliability and the correlations, means, and alphas of each scale are 
listed in Table 4. 
Results 
The Fictive Pass Asymmetry. As with our former experiments, significant Code x 
Context interactions for act and character-based judgments showed that a fictive pass was given 
to harm code violations more so than purity code violations (see Figure 5). As expected, harmful 
behavior, compared to impure behavior, was relatively more acceptable in fiction than in real-
life. This was also true of the desire to punish and for consequence ratings. However, because 
fictional acts were rated as equally consequential across both contexts, these effects are mostly 
due to real purity being seen as less consequential than real harm (Figure 6). 
Since we did not change our manipulations, real acts of harm (M = 4.92) have once again 
been rated as more condemnable than real impurities (M = 4.26), F(1, 84) = 11.52, p < .001). 
However, our modified measures of act condemnation have allowed for a wider range of 
responses and we can now see that harm violations may start higher on the scale than purity 
violations, but they also end at a lower point (Figure 5). This steeper reality to fiction slope for 
harm, relative to purity, code violations disallows the possibility that our results have been 
explained by floor effects of the purity condition.  
Moral emotions showed the expected main effect differences between anger and disgust 
in that purity, but not harm, code violations showed more disgust than anger. Only anger, 
however, showed a fictive pass asymmetry interaction. As in Experiment 3, the reality-to-fiction 
drop for disgust was about the same, and in fact non-significant, for both harm and purity. 
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Effects of mediated moderation. Our next goal was to test for mediation of the key 
Code x Context interaction on moral judgment (mediated moderation). The analysis was 
conducted with model 8 of the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2012) at 10,000 iterations. Context 
(reality vs fiction) was the predictor variable, code (harm vs purity) was the moderator, moral 
wrongness was the outcome, and character judgments and future consequences were parallel 
mediators. See Figure 7 for a visualization of this model along with the unstandardized 
regression coefficients. 
Indirect effects indicate that the effects of the Code x Context interaction on moral 
wrongness were significantly mediated by both character judgments (b = .44, SE = .21, 95% CI = 
[.10, .93]) and concerns of future consequences (b = .51, SE = .18, 95% CI = [.20, .89]). 
Moreover, the conditional direct effects indicate that judgments of purity code violations were 
fully explained by the character-related mediators (b = -.03, p = .89), whereas judgments of harm 
violations were not entirely accounted for (b = -1.28, p < .001).  
Thus, substantial variance in the complete fictive pass asymmetry effect can be explained 
by the fact that in fictional contexts, purity, as much as harm, code violations are seen as cue to a 
bad character as well as a cause of future corruption.  
Experiment 5 
 Experiment 4 lent further support to the Fictive Pass Asymmetry hypothesis by once 
again showing an evaluative discrepancy between harm and purity code violations across real 
and fictional contexts. Fictional acts of harm were significantly less condemnable than their real 
life counterparts, but this gap was relatively smaller for impure acts. Furthermore, Experiment 4 
explained these effects by indicating that purity, but not harm, code violations are seen as a cue 
FICTIONAL CONTEXTS MITIGATE HARM JUDGMENTS        25 
 
 
to a bad character, as well as the cause of future corruption. This was true regardless of the 
fictional or real context that the act occurred in.  
In Experiment 5 we pretested a new set of vignettes to increase the generalizability of our 
results and to address an issue with the pretesting of the vignettes used previously. Our previous 
pretesting had selected “purity” and “harm” scenarios based on their ability to elicit disgust more 
so than anger, and vice versa. In light of controversy about the nature of reported disgust and 
anger feelings in moral contexts (e.g., Cameron et al., 2015) and their strict correspondence to 
purity vs. harm violations (Giner-Sorolla & Chapman, in press), a more valid method of 
pretesting would be to contrast acts that are seen as immoral and as harmful to other people, 
versus immoral and not seen as harming other people. This minimal test would satisfy both the 
theoretical perspective that acts without harm to others are condemned because they violate a 
separate purity code of morality, and the perspective that they are condemned only because they 
are seen to harm entities beyond other people (such as nature, God or the self). Therefore, we 
asked how much each pretested vignette harmed other people and the extent to which it was 
morally wrong.  
We also extended the measures of emotion in order to more fully distinguish between 
anger and disgust, both in the pretest and in Experiment 5 itself. These extended emotion 
measures consisted of metaphors of each emotion (e.g.: This makes my blood boil; This makes 
me feel like I will lose my appetite) and were intended to give more specific subjective indicators 
of disgust and anger beyond semantic labels. In conjunction with our facial expression agreement 
items, and word item measures of the target emotions and synonyms of each, these items were 
expected to further distinguish between anger and disgust empirically. See supplementary 
materials F for a full description of the pretest’s method and results. 
FICTIONAL CONTEXTS MITIGATE HARM JUDGMENTS        26 
 
 
The perceived harmfulness of impurity 
 As mentioned in the Introduction, recent work has suggested that harm can be perceived 
in  purity code violations that do not harm specific individuals (Gray, Schein, & Ward, 2014; 
Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2011) because such acts conflict with one’s template of dyadic 
morality that requires both an offender and a victim (Gray, Waytz, & Young, 2012). In the 
absence of a victim, Gray et al. (2014) argue that individuals will complete their dyadic template 
of wrongdoing by assuming that harm must have still occurred to an impersonal entity. Study 5 
tested the possibility that the kind of acts we have heretofore characterized as “harm” can also be 
characterized as “harm to (specific) others” while “purity” acts can be characterized as harming 
other entities (e.g., harming the self (Chakroff, Dungan, & Young, 2013) or harming nature 
(Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2011). To reinforce the uniqueness of our harm and purity vignettes, 
we have introduced new items to measure the perceived harmfulness of each code violation to a 
variety of targets. We predict that participants’ imputations of harm will significantly differ 
between our manipulations and show a clear distinction between harmful and impure behaviors. 
A heterogeneous assessment of moral character 
 In our preceding experiments, our measures of moral character using simple items such 
as, “Is Sam mainly a bad person” may have overlooked the heterogeneous nature of moral 
character, which goes beyond mere evaluation of a person as good or bad to encompass specific 
positive prosocial traits (Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2014). To address this, we have included 
new items such as warmth, fairness, empathy, integrity, and abnormality (Goodwin et al., 2014; 
Uhlmann, Pizarro, & Diermeier, 2015) in order to more thoroughly encapsulate the scope of 
moral character. These items also have the advantage of being more independent of the purity 
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construct, compared to our previous items such as “Is Sam’s soul impure” or “is Sam rotten 
inside”. 
Desire as an alternative explanation of the asymmetry 
The final innovation of Experiment 5 sought to identify explanations of the fictive pass 
asymmetry effects beyond those of character from the previous experiment. Russell and Piazza 
(2015, Study 4) found that although bizarre sexual acts were condemned less when they were 
only desired than those that were actually acted upon, but levels of disgust remained the same. 
Considering that disgust levels have, more often than not, been stable across contexts in these 
studies, it is then reasonable to believe that asymmetries in perceived desire might drive the 
fictive pass asymmetry. Perhaps people who consume fictional impurity will be seen to desire to 
perform the act in reality more so than people who consume fictional harm, explaining why they 
are condemned more and attract more disgust. We tested this idea by measuring perceived desire 
to commit the act in the target of the scenario, and testing desire as a mediator of the fictive pass 
asymmetry, as we did with character factors in the previous study. 
Method 
 Participants. Four hundred and eighty four United States residents (284 male; Mage = 
34.77; SDage = 10.36) were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service. The 
questionnaire included an attention checking question. If participants answered it incorrectly then 
the survey automatically directed them to the debrief page and recruited a new participant in 
their place. 
Design, Materials, and Procedures. As with our former experiments, Experiment 5 was 
a 2 (code violation: harm vs purity) x 2 (context of violation: reality vs fiction) between-subjects 
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design. The three fictional contexts (imagined, watched in a film, performed in a video game) 
were collapsed into to form a single level of fiction. As in the previous experiments the 
vignettes’ text was manipulated to present the acts as occurring in different contexts. For 
example, one of the purity code violations in the context of real-life read, “Sam has sex with a 
frozen chicken before cooking it and eating it for dinner. Sam enjoys doing this”. In the context 
of imagination, however, the vignette read, “Sam imagines that he has sex with a frozen chicken 
before cooking it and eating it for dinner. He enjoys imagining this”. All dependent items were 
measured on a Likert-type scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (entirely). 
Emotion Measures. The emotion word-item measures and the facial expression 
agreement items were unchanged from our previous experiments and as previously mentioned, 
further distinctions between anger and disgust were made with three metaphors for each target 
emotion (i.e.: this makes my blood boil; this makes me lose my appetite). All items were 
collapsed into two composite variables. The anger items (α = .95) and the disgust items (α = .96) 
were reliable, had a moderate correlation (r = 0.50, [.43, .57]) and thus, were analysed 
separately. 
Act Judgments. Act-based judgments (3 items; α = .91) were unchanged from the 
previous experiment. As before, the wording of these items was modified depending on what 
context the act was presented as occurring in (e.g.: Is this morally blameworthy?/Is it morally 
blameworthy to [imagine this/watch this in a film/perform this in a video game]?). 
Character Judgments. Drawing from the literature on moral character (e.g. Goodwin et 
al., 2014; Uhlmann, Pizarro, & Diermeier, 2015), thirteen items measured different facets of 
moral character. Participants reported the extent to which they perceive the main agent as 
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abnormal, twisted, perverse, deviant, trustworthy, fair, loyal, empathetic, reliable, warm, and 
having integrity. An exploratory factor analysis with a maximum likelihood extraction and a 
promax rotation indicated that these items loaded onto two distinct factors. One factor contained 
items that related to positive and praiseworthy character traits (i.e.: warmth, loyalty, empathy, 
fairness). Items that loaded on the second factor related to negative and abnormal traits (i.e.: 
perverseness, deviance, indecency). The items of these factors had strong reliabilities (both α’s = 
.94) and shared a correlation of r = .29, [.21, .37], p < .001, thus allowing us to collapse them 
into two variables: moral character and abnormal character. All items were coded so that higher 
numbers reflected more immorality or abnormality. 
Measures of Harm. Perceptions of harm (Gray et al., 2012; Gray et al., 2014; Gutierrez 
& Giner-Sorolla, 2011) was measured towards three different entities. The items below are 
displayed in the context of reality but these items were modified to fit each fictional context. 
Social harm: Five items measured the perceived harm the agent’s actions caused to other 
individuals and to the community at large (Do you think that Sam’s actions caused 
[psychological/physical/emotional] harm to anyone other than himself? Do you think Sam’s 
actions violated the rights of anyone other than himself? Do you think that Sam’s actions caused 
harm to society at large? α = .90.) 
Self harm: Three items measured the perceived self-harm of the agent’s actions (e.g.: Do 
you think that Sam’s actions caused [psychological/physical/emotional] harm to himself? α = 
.80). 
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Natural Harm: Two items (r = .73) measured the perceived harm the agent’s actions 
caused to the natural order (e.g.: Do you think that Sam’s behaviour caused damage to the 
natural order of things? Did Sam’s actions violate any laws of nature?) 
The items of these three scales were subjected to an exploratory factor analysis with a 
maximum likelihood extraction and a promax rotation. It was indicated that these items loaded 
onto two distinct factors. The natural harm and self harm items (5 items: α = .88) loaded on one 
factor, and were averaged into the variable non-social harm. The social harm items formed one 
factor (5 items; α = .90). This loading empirically supports the idea that acts seen to harm other 
people, whether in the individual or aggregate, form a different class than acts not seen to harm 
other people, whether this harm is defined as to the self or to nature.  
Desires. Three items (α = .96) measured the main agent’s perceived desire to commit the 
described act (e.g.: Do you think that Sam [did this/imagined this/watched this in a 
film/controlled his character to do this in a video game] because he desires to actually get into a 
fight with another man and punch him in the face?). Similar to previous items, the wording was 
modified to fit the different levels of the context variable. 
Results 
The Fictive Pass Asymmetry. As in our former studies, significant Code x Context 
interactions revealed fictive pass asymmetry effects for act judgments and (reversed) judgments 
of positive moral character. There was a significantly greater reality to fiction drop in moral 
wrongness for harm code violations than for purity code violations (Figure 8). Despite their 
equality in prestesting, real acts of harm were significantly more immoral than real impurities, 
F(1, 122) = 17.75. p < .001, ηp2 = .13. In spite of this, the moral wrongness of harm violations 
FICTIONAL CONTEXTS MITIGATE HARM JUDGMENTS        31 
 
 
both started higher and ended lower on the scale (Figure 8), while the wrongness of fictitious 
purity violations was close to the scale midpoint. Both these features argue against the possibility 
that the difference in baseline morality between violation types presents a problem in interpreting 
the fictive pass asymmetry due to floor effects on fictitious purity violations. If anything, the 
floor effect is on fictitious harm violations (with a mean near 2) and would work against, not for 
the fictive pass asymmetry. 
 Main effects upon abnormal character indicated that real acts compared to fictional acts, 
F(1, 483) = 83.74, p < .001, ηp2 = .15, and impure acts compared to harmful acts, F(1, 483) = 
102.81, p < .001, ηp2 = .18, were most indicative of character abnormality. The Code x Context 
interaction (p = .11) was not statistically significant but close enough to marginal significance 
that it should not be discounted from future analyses and experiments. 
 As in Experiment 4, main effects upon anger and disgust showed that harm, but not 
purity, code violations showed more anger than disgust and vice versa but only anger showed a 
fictive pass asymmetry effect. Consistent with Experiments 3 and 4, the reality-to-fiction drop 
for disgust was non-significant for both code violations (Figure 8). 
Main effects upon desire indicated that purity code violations were more indicative of 
desire than harm violations, F(1, 453) = 4.82, p = .03, ηp2 = .01 and that real acts, relative to 
fictional acts indicated more true desires, F(1, 453) = 147.29, p < .001, ηp2  = .25. However, 
desire did not show a fictive pass asymmetry interaction (p = .57).  
The harm of “harmless” (to others) impurities. New measures of harmfulness 
addressed the possibility that our harm-purity distinction could alternatively be described as a 
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distinction between acts that harm another person, and acts that harm some other entity (Gray et 
al., 2014).  
 The effect of our manipulations on the perceived type of harm was shown in a significant 
Harm Type x Code Violation x Context interaction, F(1, 450) = 107.75, p < . 001, ηp2 = .19.  
More specifically, a Harm Type x Code Violation interaction, F(1, 450) = 321.01, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.42 indicated that harmful acts evoked stronger perception of social harms (M = 3.34) than non-
social harms (M = 2.26, p < .001), and impure acts more strongly evoked non-social harms (M = 
3.28) than social harms (M = 2.19, p < .001). This shows that our “harm/purity” distinction can 
also be characterized in terms of harm to social versus non-social entities. 
 Like the categories of harm and purity, different kinds of harm also were associated with 
different moral emotions. When controlling for disgust, social harm (b = .37, p < .001) more so 
than non-social harm (b= .05, p =.32) predicted anger; when controlling for anger, non-social 
harm strongly positively predicted disgust (b = .71, p < .001), unlike social harm (b = -0.30, p < 
.001). We ran a similar analysis while not controlling for emotion. This found that social harm (b 
= .32, p < .001) predicted anger about equally with non-social harm (b = .30, p < .001). 
However, when not controlling for anger, non-social harm still strongly positively predicted 
disgust (b = .85, p < .001), unlike social harm (b = -0.16, p = .001). 
Effects of mediated moderation. An analysis of mediated moderation was conducted 
with the PROCESS macro’s 8th model (Hayes, 2012) at 10,000 iterations. Context (reality vs 
fiction) was the predictor variable, code (harm vs purity) was the moderator, moral wrongness 
was the outcome, and judgments of character morality, character abnormality, and desires, were 
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all set as parallel mediators. See Figure 10 for a visualization of this model as well as the 
unstandardized regression coefficients. 
 The mediator’s indirect effects of the key Code x Context interaction on moral wrongness 
were significantly mediated by judgments of moral character (b = 0.18, SE = 0.05, CI = [0.10, 
0.30]) and judgments of abnormal character (b = 0.14, SE = .05, CI = [0.06, 0.25]), but not desire 
(b = -0.06, SE = .04, CI = [-0.15, 0.02]). Furthermore, the conditional direct effects indicated that 
the evaluations of purity code violations were fully explained by the character-related mediators 
(b = -0.05, p = .60) whereas social harm violations were not (b = -0.50, p < .001) (Figure 10). 
 A second analysis of mediated moderation was conducted in order to test an alternate 
temporal sequence that would be more in line with existing theoretical models of action 
attribution such as the multiple inferences model (MIM) (Reeder, 2009). The MIM posits that 
mental state attributions (e.g. immoral thoughts or desires in the context of the present work) 
may mediate the relationship between actions and trait inferences such as negative character 
judgments. As before, these additional analyses were conducted with the PROCESS macro’s 8th 
model (Hayes, 2012) at 10,000 iterations. Context (real vs fictional) was the predictor variable 
and code (harm vs purity) was the moderator. For the first analysis, moral character was the 
outcome and for the second analysis, abnormal character was the outcome. For both analyses, 
desire and moral wrongness were set as parallel mediators.  
 For the first analysis, the key Code x Context interaction on moral character was 
significantly mediated by moral wrongness (b = 0.53, SE = 0.12, CI = [0.32, 0.78]) but not by 
desires (b = -0.03, SE = .04, CI = [-0.13, 0.05]). The conditional direct effects indicated that the 
effect of social harms on character-based evaluations were explained by the mediators (b = 0.18, 
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p = .31), but impersonal purity violations were not fully explained (b = .82, p < .001) (Figure 
11).  
 For the second analysis, the key Code x Context interaction on abnormal character was 
significantly mediated by moral wrongness (b = 0.66, SE = 0.14, CI = [0.42, 0.96] but not by 
desire (b = -0.06, SE = .09, CI = [-0.25, 0.11]). The conditional direct effects indicated that the 
effects of social harms on evaluations of abnormal character were fully explained by the 
mediators (b = .06, p = .77), as were the effects of impersonal purity code violations (b = .26, p = 
.14) (Figure 12). 
 Expanding on the findings of our former experiments, the present experiment has 
provided a more thorough picture of the fictive pass asymmetry effects. Across these analyses of 
mediated moderation, the Code x Context interaction (that is, the fictive pass asymmetry effect), 
on both moral wrongness and moral character were generally explained by the fact that fictional 
purity, more so than harm, evokes moral condemnation and signals one as an abnormal and an 
immoral person. Moreover, these analyses have indicated that the effects of the fictive pass 
asymmetry can be attributed to moral condemnation, either of act or of character, while 
presumptions of desire do not explain variance in the Code x Context interaction. In other words, 
to engage with fictional impurities does not imply desire to commit the act in real life any more 
than to engage with fictional harm to others.  
Meta-analyses of the experiments 
In reporting analyses of all experiments we have collapsed the various fictional contexts 
(imagination, watched in a film, performed in a video game) into a single level, because we did 
not have any specific hypothesis regarding the fictive pass effects between these contexts. Table 
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6 in supplementary material, document D shows the specific Code x Individual fictive-context 
interactions across all five experiments. While this table can satisfy curiosity regarding any 
specific interactions, it is hard to draw any overarching conclusions from such a large display.  
To condense and systematically analyze these results, we conducted a first meta-analysis 
of experiments 3, 4, and 5 in order to get a more holistic understanding of the fictive pass effects 
by context across our experiments. This meta-analysis examined whether any given context may 
be most or least responsible for the effects of the fictive pass asymmetry. Experiments 1 and 2 
were not included in this analysis because they did not contain the full set of fictive contexts that 
ended up being included in Experiment 3 through 5. 
The meta-analysis was conducted using downloadable meta-analysis macros for SPSS 
(Wilson, 2005). To prepare the data we obtained the mean difference in moral wrongness of each 
reality vs fictive context contrast for both harm and purity code violations from Experiment 3, 4, 
and 5. The results (Figure 11) indicate that the moral wrongness difference between real and 
fictional contexts is greater for harm that it is for purity. This reinforces our consistent findings 
that harm, more so than purity, has greater influence on the effects of the fictive pass asymmetry.  
As a rule of thumb, confidence intervals that do not overlap by more than 25% are 
considered to be significantly different from one another (Cummings & Finch, 2005). In general, 
the highest reality-fiction differences were found among video games, and the lowest among 
imagination. But all three contexts meta-analytically showed the critical asymmetry, in that the 
reality-fiction difference for harm was different from that for purity. Relatively speaking, the 
strongest asymmetry was seen for film, but overall, the fictive pass asymmetry was reliably 
found in all three fictive contexts studied.     
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 We conducted a second meta-analysis of Experiments 3, 4, and 5 that focused on a 
different question: the overall effects of the fictive pass asymmetry on anger and disgust, 
collapsing as before the fictional contexts into a single level. To prepare the data, we calculated 
the reality vs. fiction mean difference for both anger and disgust across harm and purity code 
violations. Experiments 1 and 2 were excluded from analyses because Experiment 1 had a 
within-participants design that was hard to compare with the others, and Experiment 2 did not 
show sufficient differentiation between anger and disgust. 
The results of this meta-analysis (Figure 12) illustrate that the overall effects are in line 
with our expectations and show the fictive pass asymmetry effects being stronger for anger than 
for disgust. Specifically, harm and purity scenarios showed about the same amount of decline in 
disgust from reality to fiction, but harm scenarios showed much more decline in anger than 
purity scenarios did. In comparing confidence intervals, the fictional mitigation of anger at harm 
was greater than the other three effects, which did not differ from each other. 
Discussion 
The fictive pass asymmetry 
The results of these five experiments have supported our fictive pass asymmetry 
hypothesis by demonstrating that fictional contexts mitigate moral evaluations of acts that harm 
other people, more so than “purity” violations that are seen as harming only the self or abstract 
entities. Experiment 1 provided initial support by demonstrating that one who engages with 
fictional acts that harm others is seen as less immoral, less bad of a person, and evokes less anger 
than one who acts harmfully in real-life; while for purity code violations, the evaluative 
discrepancy between reality and fiction was relatively less extreme. Experiments 2 and 3 found 
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similar effects and gave additional support to the fictive pass asymmetry hypothesis via 
methodological improvements and by expanding upon the fictional contexts that the code 
violations occurred in. Experiments 4 and 5 distinguished between two roles of fictive activity: 
as a cue to bad character and as a perceived cause of bad character and actions. These also found 
the fictive pass effect, and further showed that while both roles contributed to the asymmetry 
effect, the cue role was stronger, or about equal to, the cause role; in other words, people gave 
consumers of harmful fiction a “pass” because, unlike impure fiction, it was not seen as 
indicating anything bad about their moral character.  
Although our hypothesis was phrased in terms of a difference between differences, it 
should also be noted that in general, this interaction took a specific form -- harm scenarios in real 
life were usually rated as more severe than purity scenarios, while in fiction purity tended to be 
rated as equivalent or worse than harm. This occurred even though we tried our best to pretest 
harm and purity scenarios that would be seen as equally wrong in real life, which may point to 
the simple fact that in our participants’ cultural context, harm violations are more condemnable 
than purity violations overall. This effect coexisting with the interaction and produced this 
specific pattern of means, which is still compatible with the idea that fiction leads to a stronger 
reduction in condemnation for harm versus purity. However, it is true that most of our studies did 
not literally find that purity in fiction would be condemned more than harm.  
Similarly, there was a notable difference in how severe participants’ condemnation of 
real versus fictional harm was. It may have been the case that real harm was often more severely 
condemned than real purity; however, we do not believe that this difference in severity can 
explain the fictive pass effects. The results of these experiments, including the meta-analysis, 
indicated that fictional harm was seen as less wrong than fictional purity. In other words, real 
FICTIONAL CONTEXTS MITIGATE HARM JUDGMENTS        38 
 
 
harm may be more severe than real purity, but fictional harm is also seen as less severe, which 
the status of harm as more severe overall cannot explain. Similarly, we acknowledge the role that 
unusualness plays in the perception of harmful versus impure acts (Gray and Keeney, 2015) but 
we do not think that the increased abnormality of impure acts, relative to harmful acts, is 
confounding the fictive pass effects. After all, abnormality is a defining feature of acts that lead 
to moral disgust (Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2013) so the varying amount of abnormality between 
harmful and impure acts can be seen as a feature of purity code violations, not a confounding 
“bug”.  
In those experiments for which anger and disgust were distinguishable from one another, 
anger, more often than not, demonstrated fictive pass effects. Disgust, although less consistently, 
most often showed equal effects (or non-effects) between harm and purity code violations; and 
this difference between emotions was confirmed by the meta-analysis. In other words, for harm 
violations, disgust behaved differently than anger, showing less of a drop in fictive contexts; so 
that, when targets fictionally harmed someone, the prevalent reaction towards them tended to be 
disgust rather than anger. It may be, then, that disgust at fictional harm serves the purpose of 
evaluating the actor’s character, even if there is no actual bad behavior or harmful action to be 
angry at. The role of disgust as a mark of character even in the absence of condemnable actions 
has been remarked upon (e.g. Miller, 1997; Rozin, Haidt, McCauley, 2008), but awaits further 
empirical confirmation.  
Additionally, it is interesting to consider the fictive pass asymmetry effects between the 
different fictional contexts even though we did not have any specific a priori hypotheses 
regarding these differences. Supplementary Materials C displays these interactions but they are 
also aggregated and summarized more succinctly in the meta-analysis. Across the specific Code 
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x Context interactions, there is a moderate amount of variability between the different fictional 
contexts, so that the asymmetry interaction is strongest for imaginations, then for video games, 
and least strong (though still present) for films. Retrospectively, it is plausible that this can be 
attributed to the extent to which the individual is, or is not, actively involved with generating the 
content. For the fictions that we examined, imagined content is the most internally generated, 
films are the least internally generated, and the interactive nature of video games places them 
somewhere in the middle.  
Theoretical implications 
The results of these experiments have demonstrated how the contexts that surround 
specific norm-violating acts influence how we morally evaluate these acts and the individuals 
involved. It is perhaps not surprising that fictional contexts should mitigate judgment of any 
immoral act, if one takes a purely utilitarian and consequentialist position: that right and wrong 
inhere only in the outcomes of the act. What is more noteworthy is that this mitigation is reduced 
for violations of purity moral codes, supporting existing evidence that such codes are more 
related to judgments of moral character (Chakroff & Young, 2014). Furthermore, our findings 
indicate that beliefs about future behavior are intertwined with beliefs about effects on character. 
This suggests that character morality is somewhat rooted in long-term utilitarian concerns. 
Moreover, these experiments support and expand upon the rigid nature of purity code 
evaluations, compared to the relative flexibility of harm code evaluations. Former research has 
demonstrated how these effects occur in real-life scenarios (Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007; 
Rozin, Millman, & Nemeroff, 1986), but our research has demonstrated how these principles 
hold true even in fictional contexts.  
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These claims, however, are hindered by the fact that our sample consisted of people 
living in the Western English-speaking world. As such, we cannot fully address the extent to 
which these effects would apply across different cultures2. On the one hand, early work in cross-
cultural morality put forth the idea that violations of harm are universally immoral (Turiel, 
Killen, & Helwig, 1987). On the other hand, Haidt, Koller, and Dias (1993) contested the 
exclusive wrongness of harm by suggesting that, “The domain of morality appears to vary cross-
culturally” (pg. 625). Even more recently, research has demonstrated how culture is a critical 
facet of morality (Graham, Meindl, Beall, Johnson, & Zhang, (2015); Guerra & Giner-Sorolla, 
2010; Vauclair & Fischer, 2011) and more specifically, the moralization of entertaining thoughts 
of immoral behavior can substantially vary between cultures (Cohen & Rozin, 2001). The 
amount of variability that is introduced by cross-cultural differences poses challenges while 
trying to ascertain universal truths about moral judgment. In spite of this, we believe that the 
fictive pass asymmetry does lend strong empirical support to the casually observed discrepancy 
between the appropriateness of fictional harm and purity codes, a cross-cultural study would be 
needed to assess the true generalizability of this work. 
Similarly, one must consider the ecological validity of our results, and the extent to which 
our vignettes are truly representative of the types of acts that are commonly portrayed in fiction. 
In these experiments, the scenarios offered high experimental control, but perhaps at the cost of 
ecological validity. This is because media products rarely display acts that neatly violate a single 
                                                             
2 In fact, differences are visible between film ratings systems in the United States and Scandinavia; the Scandinavian 
system places a relatively greater weight on controlling the portrayal of violence versus sex (Price, Palsson, & 
Gentile, 2014). While sex and violence in films are not perfectly translatable to purity and harm violations, this 
demonstrates how different cultures can differently evaluate these concepts. 
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moral code. For instance, harm violations usually manifest themselves in the form of violence. 
This violence, however, may infringe on the purity domain by presenting blood or gore. By 
contrast, purity code violations as they have been portrayed in these scenarios are rarely depicted 
in popular media. Indeed, the controversial “Hot Coffee” modification to Grand Theft Auto: San 
Andreas demonstrate that sexual content does not need to be particularly abnormal in order to be 
controversial as an element of fiction. One way to explain these examples as purity violations is 
that it is the public and available depiction of an activity seen as sacred, such as sex, that leads to 
moral opprobrium, even if the act itself is not seen as immoral in the appropriate context. 
Another possibility is that the thought of fictional depictions of even acceptable sexual activities 
in the hands of children, through such media as books, games, films or comics, brings up 
concerns for their purity and innocence.   
In fact, research on acceptable “community standards” of fiction has found that sexually 
explicit content intended for adults is seen as permissible, so long as minors are not involved and 
there are no depictions of sexual violence or fetishism such as bondage (Linz et al., 1995). While 
this is problematic for some of the examples that we have used to contextualize this research, it 
more importantly supports our findings by demonstrating that the most condemnable acts are 
ones that involve the body in bizarre and unnatural ways. Most of all, however, it highlights the 
need of future research that would explore the fictive pass using depictions of acts that are 
plausibly encountered in real life and across various actual fictional contexts. In a similar vein, 
future work that follows in the footsteps of the present research may benefit from including more 
comprehensive measures of desire as an alternate explanation of the relative acceptability of 
fictional acts that violate harm versus purity norms. In the present work, acceptability did not 
explain fictive pass effects any more effectively than moral condemnation, but this may have 
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been due to the fact that desire was operationalized in a neutral way that was not semantically 
related to either domain. If desires were more specifically operationalized as being deviant, then 
clearer effects may have been found; however, it might not be possible to separate judgments of 
deviant desires from judgments of deviance per se.  
Likewise, future research should also consider using more parallelism between measures of 
moral character.  For instance, Experiment 5 expanded upon character measures to focus on the 
heterogeneous nature of character (Goodwin, Piazza, Rozin, 2014) and a number of these new 
items measured character abnormality.However, abnormality and unusualness are key facets of 
purity code violations (Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2013). In the name of parallelism, future 
research should also measure character traits such as “violent,” “unkind,” or “selfish” which 
address its multifaceted nature and are semantically similar to the harm domain. 
We believe that our research sheds light on applications of moral psychology to media 
regulation. Organizations such as the USA’s MPAA, North America’s ESRB or Europe’s PEGI 
are responsible for giving standardized ratings of age appropriateness to media products so that 
consumers and parents can be aware of their content. Interestingly enough, the general 
framework of these organizations’ published criteria falls in line with the effects of the fictive 
pass asymmetry (esrb.org; pegi.info). Fictional acts of harm (mostly violence in the case of 
media products) are deemed appropriate for much younger ages than content that may be 
considered impure (such as sexual content, or other morally impure behavior such as drug use 
and gambling). Graphic depictions of blood and bodily destruction also merit older age ratings, 
again possibly due to the disgust and purity concerns that such displays bring up. These 
organizations do not offer any scientific explanations for their, perhaps intuitive, decision 
making. These experiments can therefore explain and justify their criteria as reflecting public 
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opinions about the acceptability of fictional acts, both in our findings and in the possible 
extension of our methods to parent and community samples. 
In closing, this current set of experiments has shown us that one may be given a pass for 
enjoying violent video games and films, or having aggressive thoughts towards another 
individual. Consequently, these fantasies may be seen as relatively benign and nonconsequential. 
When the fictional acts, however, involve a bizarre and socially unacceptable use of the body, 
then they are not granted the same pass that is given to fictional social harm. Not only do these 
acts signal a poor character, they are seen as a potential cause of future indiscretions. As it turns 
out, fictions are not treated equally and in spite of the fact that it is all make-believe, impure 
fiction is associated with very real consequences for behavior and character. Future research 
could continue to explore this unresolved aspect of the fictive pass asymmetry by more closely 
examining inferences of desire, and by delving deeper into the extent to which impure desires 
entail future impure –or harmful - behavior. We believe, however, that the present research 
supports the idea that fictional specific harm is more easily excused than fictional nonspecific 
harm or impurity; that anger is more subject to this flexible excuse than disgust; and that 
inferences both about existing and future character are important outcomes, beyond 
condemnation, of the asymmetry. 
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Table 1 
Mean, Standard deviations, correlation coefficients (Pearson’s r), and Cronbach’s α, Experiment 1. 
 1 2 3 4 
1. Anger     
2. Disgust 0.66 [.60, .73]    
3. Moral Wrongness 0.75 [.69, .80] 0.57 [.48, .65]   
4. Moral Character 0.56 [.47, .64] 0.48 [.38, .57] 0.60 [.52, .68]  
Mean 3.15 3.74 3.87 4.38 
SD 1.85 2.07 2.22 1.26 
Cronbach’s α = 0.91 0.95   
 
Note. All correlations are significant from zero, p < .001. 
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Dependent 
Variable Contrasts Code Main Effect Context Main Effect Interaction Effect 
 Context Code    
Moral 
Wrongness 
Reality 
vs  
Fiction 
Harm vs  
Purity b = .32, t(1340) = 1.77, p = .08 b = -1.39, t(1340) = -8.84, p <.001 b = -1.40, t(1340) = -6.30,p < .001 
Harm vs  
Pathogen b = 2.78, t(1340) = 15.61, p < .001 b = -.36, t(1340) = -2.36, p = .02 b = -2.43, t(1340) = -11.17, p < .001 
Moral 
Character 
Reality 
vs  
Fiction 
Harm vs  
Purity b = .08, t(1340) = .71, p = .48 b = -.55, t(1340) = -5.66, p < .001 b = -.69, t(1340) = -4.97, p < .001 
Harm vs  
Pathogen b = 1.10, t(1340) = 10.14, p < .001 b = -.14, t(1340) = -1.48, p = .14 b = -1.10, t(1340) = -8.25, p < .001 
 
Figure 1. Moral wrongness and moral character across all codes and contexts, Experiment 1. Means and 95% confidence intervals are presented 
above. Higher numbers equal more condemnation.
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Dependent 
Variable Contrasts Code Main Effect Context Main Effect Interaction Effect 
 Context Code      
Anger Reality vs Fiction 
Harm vs Purity b = .18, t(1340) = 1.09, p = .28 b = -.94, t(1340) = -6.40, p < .001 b = -.83, t(1340) = -3.97, p < .001 
Harm vs 
Pathogen b = 1.71, t(1340) = 11.24, p < .001 b = -.45, t(1340) = -3.43, p = .001 b = -1.31, t(1340) = -7.06, p < .001 
Disgust Reality vs Fiction 
Harm vs Purity b = -2.09, t(1340) = -12.42, p < .001 b = -1.07, t(1340) = -7.31, p < .001 b = -.01, t(1340) = -.04, p = .97 
Harm vs 
Pathogen b = -1.22, t(1340) = -7.39, p < .001 b = -.93, t(1340) = -6.55, p < .001 b = -.14, t(1340) = -.70, p = .48 
 
Figure 2. Anger and disgust across all codes and contexts, Experiment 1. Means and 95% confidence intervals are presented above. Higher 
numbers equal more negative emotion.
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Contrasts Dependent Variable Code Main Effect Context Main Effect Interaction Main Effect 
Code Context     
Harm 
vs 
Purity 
Reality 
vs 
Fiction 
Negativity F(1, 267) = 73.53, p < .001, ηp2 = .22 F(1, 267) = 36.78, p < .001, ηp2 = .12 F(1, 267) = 29.84, p < .001, ηp2 = .10 
 
Figure 3. Negativity across all codes and contexts, Experiment 2. Means and 95% confidence intervals are presented above. Higher numbers 
equal more negativity.
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Table 2 
Means, standard deviations, Cronbach’s α, correlation coefficients (Pearson’s r), and correlation confidence intervals, Experiment 3 
 1 2 3 4 
1. Anger     
2. Disgust 0.42 [.33, .51]    
3. Act-based Judgments 0.69 [.62, .74] 0.49 [.41, .57]   
4. Character-based Judgments 0.61 [.53, .68] 0.52 [.44, .60] 0.77 [.72, .81]  
Mean 2.93 4.28 3.69 3.35 
SD 1.68 1.86 1.83 1.69 
Cronbach’s α = 0.94 0.94 0.91 0.94 
 
Note.  All correlations are significant from zero, p < .001; N = 316. 
FICTIONAL CONTEXTS MITIGATE HARM JUDGMENTS        56 
 
 
 
Contrasts Dependent Variable Code Main Effect Context Main Effect Interaction Main Effect 
Code Context     
Harm 
vs 
Purity 
Reality vs 
Fiction 
Act-based 
judgments F(1, 315) = 3.81, p = .05, ηp
2  = .012 F(1, 315) = 21.10, p < .001, ηp2  = .063 F(1, 315) = 5.52, p = .02, ηp2  = .02 
  Character-based Judgments F(1, 315) = .29, p = .59, ηp
2  = .01 F(1, 315) = 11.32, p < .01, ηp2  = .04 F(1, 315) = 2.65, p = .11, ηp2  = .01 
  Anger F(1, 315) = 18.46, p < .01, ηp2  = .06 F(1, 315) = 8.28, p = .004, ηp2  = .03 F(1, 315) = 2.26, p = .13, ηp2  = .01 
  Disgust F(1, 315) = 77.83, p < .001, ηp2  = .01 F(1, 315) = 11.32, p < .01, ηp2  = .04 F(1, 315) = 2.65, p = .53, ηp2  = .01 
 
Figure 4. Moral judgments and moral emotions across all codes and contexts, Experiment 3. Means and 95% confidence intervals are presented 
above. Higher numbers equal more condemnation or more negative emotion.
5.01
4.01 4.02 3.783.39 3.49 2.93 3.41
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Harm Purity Harm Purity
Act-based Judgments Character-based Judgments
Reality
Fiction
4.02
2.78
3.80
5.80
3.09
2.49
3.23
4.96
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Harm Purity Harm Purity
Anger Disgust
Reality
Fiction
FICTIONAL CONTEXTS MITIGATE HARM JUDGMENTS        57 
 
 
Table 3 
Means, standard deviations, Cronbach’s alpha, correlation coefficients (Pearson’s r), and correlation confidence intervals, Experiment 4 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Anger        
2. Disgust 0.46 [.38, .55]       
3. Act-based Judgments 0.59 [.52, .65] 0.48 [.39, .56]      
4. Character-based 
Judgments 
0.58 [.50, .65] 0.47 [.39, .54] 0.68 [.62, .73]   
  
5. Consequences 0.52 [.44, .59] 0.41 [.32, .49] 0.75 [.70, .79] 0.70 [.64, .75]    
6. Punishment 0.55 [.47, .61] 0.31 [.21, .41] 0.72 [.66, .77] 0.58 [.51, .64] 0.60 [.53, .66]   
7. Moral Wrongness 0.57 [.49, .64] 0.44 [.35, .52] 0.90 [.88, .92] 0.68 [.62, .73] 0.73 [.68, .77] 0.71 [.65, .76]  
Mean 3.03 4.52 3.53 3.28 3.78 2.40 3.40 
SD 1.62 1.81 1.99 1.66 1.45 1.87 2.13 
Cronbach’s α = 0.93 0.94 0.88 0.96 0.93   
 
Note. All correlations are significant from zero, p < .001; N = 352;  = single item scale. 
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Contrasts Dependent 
Variable Code Main Effect Context Main Effect Interaction Main Effect 
Code Context     
Harm vs 
Purity 
Reality vs 
Fiction 
Act 
Judgments F(1, 343) = .66, p = .42, ηp
2  = .001 F(1, 343) = 70.13, p < .001, ηp2  = .17 F(1, 343) = 26.79, p < .001, ηp2  = .07 
 Character Judgments F(1, 343) = 2.14, p = .15, ηp
2  = .006 F(1, 343) = 17.26, p < .001, ηp2  = .05 F(1, 343) = 6.38, p < .05, ηp2  = .02 
 Anger F(1, 343) = 19.69, p < .001, ηp2  = .05 F(1, 343) = 14.06, p < .001, ηp2  = .04 F(1, 343) = 10.56, p < .001, ηp2  = .03 
 Disgust F(1, 343) = 83.68, p < .001, ηp2  = .20 F(1, 343) = 1.68, p < .20, ηp2  = .005 F(1, 343) = .26, p < .61, ηp2  = .001 
 
Figure 5. Moral condemnation and moral emotions across all codes and contexts, Experiment 4. Means and 95% confidence intervals are 
presented above. Higher numbers equal more condemnation or more negative emotion.
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Contrasts Dependent 
Variable Code Main Effect Context Main Effect Interaction Main Effect 
Code Context     
Harm 
vs 
Purity 
Reality 
vs 
Fiction 
Desire to Punish F(1, 343) = 6.90, p < .01, ηp2  = .02 F(1, 343) = 66.89, p < .001, ηp2  = .16 F(1, 343) = 25.24, p < .001, ηp2  = .07 
 Future Consequences F(1, 343) = 1.01, p = .32, ηp
2  = .003 F(1, 343) = 77.36, p < .001, ηp2  = .18 F(1, 343) = 6.26, p < .05, ηp2  = .02 
 
Figure 6. Desire to punish and future consequences across all codes and contexts, Experiment 4. Means and standard deviations are shown 
above. Higher numbers equal more punishment or the presumption of greater future consequences.
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Figure 7. Unstandardized regression coefficients showing the mediating effects of character judgments and future consequences on the 
interactive effect of the Code x Context interaction on moral wrongness, Experiment 4 
Note: * < .05; ** < .01, *** < .001; Bold paths indicate significant indirect effects (95% CIs exclude zero). 
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Table 4 
Means, standard deviations, Cronbach’s alphas, correlations coefficients (Pearson’s r), and correlation confidence intervals, Experiment 5 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Anger         
2. Disgust 0.50 [.43, .57]        
3. Act-based 
Judgments 
0.60 [.54, .65] 0.52 [.45, .59]       
4. Moral 
Character 
0.37 [.29, .45] 0.23 [.14, .31] 0.45 [.38, .52]      
5. Abnormal 
Character 
0.37 [.29, .45] 0.73 [.69, .77] 0.59 [.53, .65] 0.29 [.21, .37]     
6. Desire 0.42 [.35, .49] 0.45 [.38, .52] 0.61 [.55, .66] 0.36 [.28, .44] 0.58 [.52, .64]    
7. Social Harm 0.51 [.44, .57] 0.19 [.10, .27] 0.68 [.63, .73] 0.29 [.21, .37] 0.29 [.21, .37] 0.44 [.36, .51]   
8. Non-social 
Harm 
0.48 [.41, .54] 0.60 [.54, .65] 0.66 [.60, .71] 0.20 [.11, .28] 0.62 [.57, .67] 0.47 [.40, .54] 0.50 [.43, .57]  
Mean 2.50 3.53 3.07 5.10 3.90 4.21 2.30 2.52 
SD 1.47 1.86 1.87 1.19 1.76 1.91 1.66 1.48 
Cronbach’s α  0.93 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.96 0.90 0.88 
Note. All correlations are significant from zero, p < .001; N = 484 
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Contrasts Dependent Variable Code Main Effect Context Main Effect Interaction Main Effect 
Code Context     
Harm 
vs 
Purity 
Reality vs 
Fiction 
Act-based 
judgments F(1, 450) = 0.36, p = .55, ηp
2 = .001 F(1, 450) = 184.52, p < .001, ηp2 = .29 F(1, 450) = 41.82, p = <.001, ηp2 = .09 
  Character-based Judgments F(1, 480) = 53.74, p < .001, ηp
2 = .10 F(1, 480) = 11.61, p = .001, ηp2 = .02 F(1, 480) = 21.10, p < .001, ηp2 = .04 
  Anger F(1, 480) = 6.39, p = .01, ηp2  = .01 F(1, 480) = 38.03, p < .001, ηp2  = .07 F(1, 480) = 6.00, p = .02, ηp2  = .01 
  Disgust F(1, 480) = 149.93, p < .001, ηp2  = .24 F(1, 480) = 29.64, p < .001, ηp2  = .06 F(1, 480) = 0.04, p = .84, ηp2  = .00 
 
Figure 8. Moral judgments and moral emotions across all codes and contexts, Experiment 5. Means and 95% confidence intervals are presented 
above. Higher numbers equal more condemnation or more negative emotion.
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Contrasts Dependent Variable Code Main Effect Context Main Effect Interaction Main Effect 
Code Context     
Harm 
vs 
Purity 
Reality vs 
Fiction 
Abnormal 
Character F(1, 480) = 120.81, p < .001, ηp
2 = .18 F(1, 480) = 83.74, p < .001, ηp2 = .15 F(1, 480) = 2.64, p = .11, ηp2 = .005 
  Desire F(1, 480) = 53.74, p < .001, ηp2 = .10 F(1, 480) = 11.61, p = .001, ηp2 = .02 F(1, 480) = 21.10, p < .001, ηp2 = .04 
  Social Harm F(1, 450) = 73.52, p < .001, ηp2  = .14 F(1, 450) = 234.67, p < .001, ηp2  = .34 F(1, 450) = 65.81, p < .001, ηp2  = .13 
  Non-Social Harm F(1, 450) = 52.15, p < .001, ηp2  = .10 F(1, 450) = 45.42, p < .001, ηp2  = .09 F(1, 450) = 1.45, p = .23, ηp2  = .00 
 
Figure 9. Abnormal character judgments, presumption of desire, and presumption of harm across all codes and contexts, Experiment 5. Means 
and 95% confidence intervals are presented above. Higher numbers equal more condemnation, presumption of desire, or harmfulness.
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Figure 10. Unstandardized regression coefficients showing the mediating effects of moral character, abnormal character, and the presumption 
of desires on the interactive effect of Code x Context on moral wrongness, Experiment 5.  
Note: * < .05; ** < .01, *** < .001; Bold paths indicate significant indirect effects (95% CIs exclude zero). 
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Figure 11. Unstandardized regression coefficients showing the mediating effects of moral wrongness, and the presumption of desires on 
the interactive effect of Code x Context on moral character, Experiment 5. Note: * < .05; ** < .01, *** < .001; Bold paths indicate 
significant indirect effects (95% CIs exclude zero), dashed paths are non-significant. 
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Figure 12. Unstandardized regression coefficients showing the mediating effects of moral wrongness, and the presumption of desires on 
the interactive effect of Code x Context on abnormal character, Experiment 5. Note: * < .05; ** < .01, *** < .001; Bold paths indicate 
significant indirect effects (95% CIs exclude zero), dashed paths are non-significant. 
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Figure 13. The mean effect sizes and 95% confidence intervals for each reality vs individual 
fictive-context contrast on moral wrongness across both code violations, Experiments 3, 4, 
4b, and 5.
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Figure 14. The mean effect sizes and 95% confidence intervals for the reality vs fiction 
contrast of anger and disgust across both code violations, Experiments 3, 4, 4b, and 5. 
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